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Abstract 
The  Queensland  Fruit  Fly  (QFF)  —  Bactrocera  tryoni  —  poses  a  significant  threat  to  horticultural 
production in Victoria causing losses of fruit and jeopardising access to interstate and international 
markets.  The  Victorian  Government  implements  and  largely  funds  an  area  freedom  program  to 
manage QFF. Concern about the record number of outbreaks in 2007-08 and the escalating costs of 
maintaining the current management regime, led the Victorian Department of Primary Industries to 
review the program to identify improved strategies for managing QFF. As part of this work, a benefit 
cost  analysis  (BCA)  of  alternative  strategies  has  been  conducted.  While  the  BCA  method  is  well 
established, in general few studies are publicly available for area freedom programs. In this paper a 
number of the practical issues encountered in analysing area freedom are detailed, such as estimating 
welfare effects, how to consider social and environmental costs and benefits and incorporating risk for 
managing  pests.    Implications  for  policy  and  the  design  of  future  programs  are  discussed.  The 
approach and issues identified in this paper provide insights for other agencies undertaking similar 
BCAs to inform biosecurity policy. 
1  Introduction 
The method for undertaking a benefit cost analysis (BCA) is well established, however, many 
analyses on area freedom biosecurity programs remain unpublished. The purpose of this paper 
is to discuss the approach taken for the BCA undertaken by Victorian Department of Primary 
Industries (DPI) on three alternative management strategies for Queensland fruit fly (Ha et al. 
forthcoming), the findings and some of the issues encountered with the aim of providing 
insights for other agencies that might undertake or have undertaken similar BCAs. 
2  Background 
The Queensland fruit fly (QFF) — Bactrocera tryoni — is recognised as one of the world’s 
worst horticultural pests. A native Australian species, QFF has the ability to infest a wide 
range of fruits. In 2006-07, fruit growers in Victoria generated more than $1 billion gross 
value of product from producing fruits susceptible to QFF. Pome fruit production had the 
highest annual gross value in 2006-07 at approximately $330 million, followed by grapes 
(approximately  $295  million),  stone  fruits  (approximately  $244  million),  tomatoes 
(approximately  $82  million)  and  citrus  (approximately  $65  million)  (ABS  2008).  Key 
production regions of QFF host fruit in Victoria by quantity of production are shown in figure 
1.  
Female QFF lay eggs in the host fruit, larvae hatch and eventually eat their way out of the 
fruit, damaging the flesh and promoting rotting from the inside out. Originally found only in 
tropical and subtropical rainforests in Queensland, stable populations of QFF have established 
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in parts of New South Wales and eastern Victoria following the introduction of European 
cultivated  fruits  that  are  suitable  hosts  (see  permanent  fruit  fly  zone  in  figure 1).  The 
consequence of QFF outbreaks on Victorian producers has been to temporarily stop market 
access of host fruit products to QFF sensitive domestic markets such as South Australia and 
Tasmania, and international markets such as New Zealand and the United States. 
 
Figure 1: QFF host fruit production, 2005-06 
 
Source: Ha et al. (forthcoming) 
 
2.1  Biosecurity management approaches 
2.1.1  Area wide management 
In  Victoria,  the  DPI  manages  QFF  through  an  ‘area-wide  management’  program.  This 
includes monitoring and eradication activities in the Fruit Fly Exclusion Zone (FFEZ), the 
Sunraysia Pest Free Area (PFA) and urban centres along the QFF host fruit supply chain (see 
figure  1).  This  is  consistent  with  the  definition  of  area  wide  management  (AWM)  as  an 
‘approach that targets pest populations in all areas, including non-commercial urban settings, 
non-cultivated and wild host areas’ (Vreysen et al, 2007: v). AWM is a management tool 
which addresses issues of scale and coordination to achieve particular outcomes such as area 
freedom from pests (Devorshak 2008). 
In  Victoria,  AWM  with  respect  to  QFF  currently  involves  the  delivery  of  coordinated 
response and surveillance programs across all horticultural production (including the FFEZ) 
and  urban  areas  of  the  state  according  to  the  QFF  National  Code  of  Practice  (with  the 
exception of the permanent fruit fly zone in East Gippsland, see figure 1). The FFEZ was 
established in 1994 through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Victoria, New   4 
South Wales and South Australia to keep the Sunraysia (VIC), Riverland (SA) and Riverina 
(NSW) horticultural production regions free from fruit fly. This MOU was implemented prior 
to the World Trade Organisation’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement which came 
into  affect  in  1995.  The  area  freedom  provided  by  the  FFEZ  ‘allowed  access  to  many 
international markets without the costly need to disinfest produce’, including new markets for 
citrus and stone fruit in the United States, New Zealand and South East Asia (Sutherst et al. 
2000: 468; Victoria DPI 2010). The MOU for the FFEZ was not renewed in 2001, however, it 
continues to be administered on an informal basis through the Tri-State Fruit Fly Committee 
(TSFFC 2010).
2 
2.1.2  Pest free and low pest prevalence areas 
Pest  free  and  low  pest  prevalence  areas  for  fruit  flies  are  among  a  number  of  defined 
outcomes that may be required importing countries. A pest free area (PFA) is ‘an area in 
which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, 
where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained’ (IPPC 2006). While an area 
of low pest prevalence (ALPP) is defined as an area ‘in which a specific pest occurs at low 
levels  and  which  is  subject  to  effective  surveillance,  control  or  eradication  measures’  as 
accepted by international trading partners (IPPC 2008). The International Plant Protection 
Convention sets standards relating to such biosecurity measures to ensure that the introduction 
and spread of pests of plants and plant products is prevented while facilitating trade (World 
Trade Organisation 2009). The international standards for phytosanitary measures (ISPMs) 
set out standards for the establishment of PFAs (ISPM 26) and ALPPs for fruit flies (ISPM 
30). 
Devorshak (2008: 411) notes that the ISPMs contribute to AWM programs in two ways:  
1.  Trading partners should be prepared to recognise the results of a successful [AWM] 
program as meeting requirements, for example, of a PFA or an ALPP. 
2.  These standards provide scientific and technical guidance for the design and operation 
of key components of [AWM] programs. 
Victoria’s  QFF  AWM  program  aims  to  prove  area  freedom  from  QFF  for  the  Sunraysia 
region as set out in ISPM 26 to enable export and interstate trade. The FFEZ provides a buffer 
of  protection  to  the  Greater  Sunraysia  PFA,  which  is  the  main  source  of  exports  to 
international  markets  that  are  sensitive  to  fruit  fly.  Major  sensitive  destinations  for 
horticulture exports from Victoria such as the United States, Indonesia and New Zealand are 
amongst  15  countries  which  recognise  this  PFA.  DPI  inspectors  routinely  verify  that 
consignments of fruit have been treated for QFF (imports as well as exports), as well as 
accrediting  individual  businesses  under  self-verification  arrangements  or  Interstate 
Certification Assurance (ICA) arrangements, to ensure the PFA is maintained. 
2.2  Increases in outbreaks 
In recent times, the number of outbreaks in Victorian horticultural production areas has been 
increasing (see figure 2). This has been attributed to a number of factors including climate and 
changes in landuse. Traditionally QFF become less active over winter and are thought to stop 
breeding, reducing population size. However, recent mild winters in Victoria have allowed 
populations to persist and remain active for 12 months of the year. When generations of fruit 
flies overlap, large populations of fruit flies can develop if they are not quickly suppressed (A. 
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Tompkins, Victorian DPI, pers. comm., 24 November 2008). Demographic changes have seen 
increased numbers of lifestyle farms in horticultural areas in recent years (Barr 2005). These 
lifestyle farms may also be facilitating increased outbreaks of QFF in horticultural regions 
due to different priorities and resource constraints around fruit production and management 
(see Graziano Ceddia et al. 2008 for discussion of biosecurity risks from hobby farms). 
Figure 2: QFF outbreaks 2002-03 to 2007-08 
 
Source: Ha et al. (forthcoming) 
The  majority  of  outbreaks  from  2002-03  to  2007-08  have  occurred  in  the  Goulburn  and 
Ovens-Murray regions, where the permanent fruit fly zone and the fruit fly exclusion zone are 
closest and two national highways run through. There are also a number of large towns in this 
region which facilitate the spread of QFF through backyard host fruit production. 
The cost of maintaining the QFF management regime for Victoria has been escalating in 
recent years (see table 1). In 2007-08 there were a high number of outbreaks in Victoria that 
disrupted both domestic and foreign market access. The cost to the State government was 
approximately  $2.6 million  in  operational  costs  and  $660 000  for  traps,  sterile  insect 
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Table 1: Operating and eradication costs of the fruit fly program to Victoria 
($’000) 
  1997-98*   1998-99*   1999-00*   2007-08  
Market access, monitoring and surveillance, and 
compliance across regions  788  779  873  1,990 
Response and eradication  35  80  235  675 
TOTAL  823  859  1108  2665 
Note: only operating costs from 2007-08 which were consistent with estimates for similar operations in the PWC (2001) report 
were included. 
Source: Ha et al. (forthcoming) and PWC (2001). 
*Costs are not adjusted for inflation. 
 
In  response  to  these  escalating  costs,  the  Victorian  DPI  initiated  a  review  of  all  QFF 
operations and management which was completed in November 2008 by Kalang Consultancy 
Services Pty Ltd (2008). It presented three alternative options for managing QFF, where the 
main differences were around the management strategies outside of PFAs and subsequent 
impact on the risk of an outbreak (see table 2).  
Table 2: Comparison of proposed management options for a new QFF program 






PFA in high 
production areas. 
a 




None – QFF becomes 
endemic where suitable 
host fruits and climate 
permits. 






Only required for fruit 
going into PFAs. 
Required for all fruit 
coming into Victoria. 
Required for all fruit 
going into PFAs 
Requirements for rest 
of Victoria uncertain. 
Risk of outbreak 
relative to current 
regime 
Higher.  Same.  Lower.  
Note: a All management options are modelled with PFAs in high production areas in the following regions: Melbourne, 
Sunraysia, Goulburn-Murray and Loddon: b These costs are borne by interstate fruit producers and not considered in the 
Victorian DPI BCA.  
Source: Kalang Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (2008) 
 
Traditionally, the choice of a new QFF management program may have been determined by 
the  risk  of  outbreak  alone  (see  the  final  row  in  table  2).  However,  limited  budgets  to 
implement  such  programs  mean  that  a  wider  range  of  factors  need  to  be  considered  in 
deciding where and how to allocate resources to address biosecurity risks. The discipline of 
economics  can  be  of  use,  together  with  science, in  informing  biosecurity  decisions  when 
resources are limited.   7 
3  Economics of biosecurity 
The economics of biosecurity has been described as ‘the choice of whether, when and how to 
attempt to manage insects and other pests with scarce capital or labour’ (Mumford and Norton 
1984: 157). In particular, what distinguishes the economic approach from scientific approach 
is the consideration of the costs and benefits associated with each of these ‘choices’ so that 
scarce resources are allocated to their highest value use and social welfare is maximised. 
Choices will be influenced by the level at which the decision is being made (farm level, state 
or national policy level) and the resources available to the decision maker. 
Biosecurity  choices  can  be  categorised  into  two  broad  groups:  pre  and  post  incursion 
management  (Beare  et  al.  2005).  Pre-incursion  management  strategies  include:  border 
controls, surveillance and planning (Beare et al. 2005). In the case of QFF, the National Code 
of  Practice  determines  when  an  incursion  occurs  and  when  post-incursion  strategies  are 
triggered.  Post-incursion  management  strategies  include  activities  such  as  adaptation, 
containment and eradication (Beare et al. 2005). It is also important to recognise that pre and 
post incursion strategies are interdependent. For example, high levels of surveillance may 
increase chances of early detection of an exotic pest as well as reducing containment and 
eradication costs. 
According to economic theory, whether decision makers engage in pre or post border actions 
and to what extent, should be determined by the level of net benefits generated. BCAs are the 
most commonly used decision tool to estimate the net benefits of biosecurity management 
strategies.  It  allows  the  assessment  of  the  costs  and  benefits  for  a  range  of  alternative 
management  strategies  against  some  base  case  scenario.  In  biosecurity  this  base  case  is 
usually a ‘do nothing’ scenario so that the benefits of avoiding (or reducing the occurrence of) 
an incursion, and hence costs avoided, are measured (Beare et al. 2005). An economic optimal 
level of biosecurity will depend on many things including (EPRB 2005):  
•  detailed understanding of where disease threats originate 
•  how they are spread 
•  probabilities of success for pre and post incursion actions  
•  an understanding of the expected benefits and costs of such actions 
On this last point, it is important to consider all benefits and costs, including those which are 
not captured by a market. Examples include environmental costs to native species from an 
exotic pest incursion or impacts to integrated pest management (IPM) systems from increased 
use of chemicals to manage an exotic pest. If the market costs and benefits do not clearly 
support any biosecurity management strategy compared to a do nothing approach and non 
market impacts are likely to be significant, it may be necessary to explicitly assess these non 
market costs and benefits using valuation techniques such as contingent valuation, hedonic 
pricing, travel cost method or others (Beare et al. 2005). Livingston (2007) and Peterson and 
Orden  (2008)  are  among  recent  studies  that  have  assessed  pest  management  regimes  and 
found that the level of protection could be reduced, increasing gains to consumers and overall 
net benefits without significant impact on the risk of incursion. These results show that it is 
important for decision makers to consider all benefits and costs of pest management strategies 
to  avoid  imposing  unnecessary  costs,  particularly  on  consumers  and  governments  who  in 
most cases bear the brunt of the costs of biosecurity programs.   8 
4  Method used in Victorian QFF BCA 
The method used in the Victorian QFF BCA involved assessing ex ante the direct benefits and 
costs  of  the  three  proposed  management  options  (see  table  2)  against  a  ‘do  nothing’ 
counterfactual.  The  do  nothing  counterfactual  meant  that  no  monitoring,  eradication  or 
certification  and  accreditation  programs  for  QFF  would  be  undertaken  by  the  Victorian 
Government and growers of QFF host fruits would apply pre and post harvest chemicals to 
control  QFF  infestations  to  maintain  domestic  and  export  market  access.  The  benefits 
quantified in the BCA are avoided chemical costs and market access premiums for the citrus 
industry. Costs quantified were those associated with establishing pest free areas, monitoring 
and eradication of QFF outbreaks. Unpriced benefits and costs such as maintaining IPM for 
producers  and  backyard  growers  as  a  source  of  infestations  were  considered  but  not 
quantified. Indirect benefits and costs, such as limits on the trade of commodities, were not 
considered in the Ha et al. (forthcoming) study.  
5  Issues encountered in conducting the QFF BCA 
Three  publicly  available BCAs  on  QFF  management  strategies  were  found  to  inform  the 
approach taken in the Victorian DPI BCA. A summary of these can be found in table 3.
3 In 
each of these BCAs the following issues required judgement on the part of the researchers 
undertaking the study: 
•  Risk and uncertainty; 
•  Length of period to consider benefits and costs; 
•  Welfare impacts to consumers; and  
•  Costs and benefits quantified and unquantified.  
The following section discusses the reasoning behind the Victorian DPI approach used in 
deciding how to account for these variables in the BCA. 
5.1  Incorporating risk 
In  the  Ha  et  al.  (forthcoming)  BCA,  risk  was  defined  as  the  probability  of  an  outbreak 
occurring and probabilistic analysis was undertaken using @Risk software. Uncertainty was 
characterised by lack of complete information on the probabilities of the size and duration of 
an outbreak. Two scenarios were defined and analysed to estimate effects of uncertainty of 
outbreaks around these variables. . 
The main risk components to the QFF management plans are: 
•  The frequency of outbreaks of QFF; 
•  The duration of outbreaks; 
•  The spread of outbreaks; and 
•  The severity of outbreaks, in terms of costs of remedying the situation. 
 
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that only BCAs that considered QFF are presented here but that the authors acknowledge economic 
analysis of other pests could provide useful insight.  Table 3    Summary of approach taken by previous QFF BCA 
Study and purpose  Treatment of risk  Costs and benefits quantified  Costs and benefits not 
quantified 
Consumer surplus  Producer surplus 
Horticultural Policy Council 
(1991) 
To estimate benefits and costs 
of removing an area freedom 
strategy for QFF in southern 
Australia. 
Two types of infestations 
considered, normal and heavy. 
State and territory government 
annual costs (monitoring, eradication, 
inspections, certification, 
administrative). 
Direct annual costs to citrus growers 
(pre and post harvest treatments, 
baiting, inspection and certification). 
Backyard growers. 
IPM systems. 
Higher levels of 





No change as imports 
would fill local demand 
at world prices. 
Loss from increased costs 
due to chemical use. 
Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(2001) 
To estimate benefits and costs 
of the Tri-State Fruit Fly 
Strategy, identify beneficiaries 
of the Strategy and 
recommend an equitable 
system for contributions. 
Not included.  Annualised avoided chemical costs. 
Annualised market access premiums 
for citrus, stonefruit, apples, table 
grapes and melons. 
Annualised costs of running the tri-
state MOU.  
Domestic market 
access. 
Home garden impacts. 
Downstream and 
regional impacts. 
Gain from lower prices 
due to excess supply on 
domestic market. 
Loss from international 
market access suspension. 
Loss from lower prices due 
to excess supply on 
domestic market from loss of 
international market access. 
Chambers and Franco-Dixon 
(2007) 
To estimate benefits and costs 
of a QFF area freedom 
strategy in the Central Burnett 
region considering probabilities 
of policy changes that would 
affect market access and 
chemical use.  
State contingent analysis of 
interstate trade policy (extension of 
ICA-28 and acceptance of 
dimethoate). 
Sensitivity analysis on domestic 
and export prices, probabilities 
around ICA and APVMA decisions. 
Benefits and costs quantified over 10 
year period. 
Past and future benefits and costs 
included: 
premium for domestic markets due 
to lower transport costs. 
costs of the Central Burnett area 
freedom scheme. 
Not discussed.  Gain from lower prices 
due to excess supply 
on domestic market. 
Loss due to shortage of 
supply in interstate 
markets, increasing 
price. 
Loss from lower prices due 
to excess supply on 
domestic market from loss of 
inter-state market access. 
Loss from an increase in 
citrus sent to export markets 
where price is lower. 
Losses in export market due 
to increase in supply from 
Central Burnett lowering 
prices further. 
Ha et al. (forthcoming) 
To estimate benefits and costs 
of three alternative QFF area 
freedom management 
strategies. 
Probability distributions of an 
outbreak occurring. 
Sensitive analysis on market 
premiums, chemical costs. 
Changes in frequency of outbreaks 
and costs considered together. 
Benefits and costs quantified over 20 
year period 
benefits and costs included: 
Avoided chemical costs. 
Market access premiums for citrus. 
Backyard growers. 
IPM systems. 
No change as imports 
would fill local demand 
at world prices 
Loss from international 
market access suspension 
Loss from increased costs 
due to chemical use   8 
Initially  it  was  thought  that  frequency  of  outbreaks,  duration  of  outbreaks  (severity  and 
spread) and price risks could be included using probabilistic analysis. In practice, information 
was only obtainable about the frequency of outbreaks for alternative management regimes. 
Attempts to incorporate duration, spread and severity of outbreak were hampered by lack of 
information. Consequently, only the risk of the frequency of QFF outbreaks was included and 
is the key determinant of eradication and disinfestation costs in the Victorian DPI. It is these 
costs that differentiated each management option. 
Monte Carlo simulation was used to include the probability distribution of an outbreak event. 
The outputs of the analysis were expressed in terms of distributions, mean and variance, and 
allowed the management options to be evaluated in terms of risk and return. Central to the 
risk  analysis  in  the  BCA  were  judgements  by  the  DPI  Victoria  technical  staff  about  the 
probability of outbreaks under different management regimes. These estimates were reviewed 
by  the  authors  with  regards  to  information  about  actual  outbreaks  under  the  current 
management regime. 
Chambers and Franco-Dixon (2007) used a state-contingent approach to incorporate the risk 
of two particular decisions being made by industry bodies on producers in the Central Burnett 
region being able to export citrus to interstate and international markets. The first risk is from 
the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (APVMA) banning the use of 
dimethoate in post harvest treatment of citrus fruits (which currently allows access to the 
South Australian, West Australian and Tasmanian markets). The second risk is the failure to 
extend the ICA 28 scheme (pre-harvest bait spraying and post harvest inspection instead of 
dimethoate dipping post harvest) to the central Burnett region. Payoff matrix probabilities on 
both the risk variables were constructed for a with and without area freedom in the central 
Burnett  region.  Probabilities  for  a  best,  middle  and  worst  case  were  given  for  the  ICA 
negotiations; and probabilities for no, medium and high impact were given for the outcome of 
the APVMA decision. 
The HPC (1991) BCA addressed uncertainty around the number and size of outbreaks in their 
study by estimating the costs of QFF infestation with normal and high QFF infestation levels 
for valencia, navel, lemon, mandarin and grapefruits. The high infestation levels involved a 
40 per cent increase in cost per hectare and number of applications for valencia and lemons, a 
25 per cent  increase  in  cost  per  hectare  and  number  of  applications  for  mandarins  and  a 
15 per cent increase in cost per hectare and number of applications for grapefruit. There was 
no discussion about what constituted a heavy infestation relative to a normal infestation in 
regards to the number or size of outbreaks in any given year. 
The state contingent approach was not appropriate to the Victorian DPI BCA because of the 
recurrent nature of outbreaks under ongoing area freedom strategies. While the states in the 
Chambers and Franco-Dixon paper were specific to policy decisions by peak bodies over a 
particular  time  period  which  would  influence  the  benefit  of  introducing  area  freedom 
strategies. Outbreaks in the Victorian DPI BCA have the possibility of occurring, or not, 
every year under each of the management strategies; that is, an outbreak in one year was 
independent of an outbreak in another year.  
The Victorian DPI BCA used a method similar to the HPC (1991) method of high and normal 
infestation rate to address the uncertainty surrounding the frequency of QFF outbreaks and 
their  severity  and  the  differences  in  preventing  an  outbreak  from  occurring  for  the  three 
proposed options.
4 The sensitivity of the BCA results to the probability of outbreaks was 
                                                 
4 Uncertainty here is tied to the trends in climate over the longer term, where a hotter drier climate and lower average rainfall 
may result in a decrease in QFF populations (Ha et al. forthcoming).   9 
tested  by  halving  the  frequency  of  outbreaks  for  all  options.  Scenario  analyses  were 
undertaken where more than one assumption was changed at one time to also test the BCA 
results in the Victorian DPI BCA. Scenario one involved a doubling of both outbreaks and 
suppression costs for each option, while scenario two quadrupled the frequency of outbreaks 
for option three and doubled outbreak frequency for the other options (Ha et al. forthcoming). 
5.2  Choice of time period for BCA 
The studies in table 3 have each used different time periods. Time periods chosen for each 
study  have  been  driven by  the  objective  or  particular  question  the  study  was  addressing. 
Chambers  and  Franco-Dixon  (2007)  chose  a  10  year  period  in  which  the  likelihood  of  a 
policy change in regard to the use dimethoate by the APVMA might occur.
5 PWC (2001) 
assessed the benefits and costs of the Tri-State QFF Committee continuing to oversee the 
coordination of the Fruit Fly Exclusion Zone (FFEZ). The benefits and costs were assessed on 
an annual basis and the authors reasoned that the Tri-State agreement could be ‘dismantled 
rapidly, with little lingering control  effect’ persisting through to following seasons (PWC 
2001: 3).
6 The HPC (1991) BCA also calculated the benefits and costs on a per annum basis, 
although this was separate to any state coordination programs and included State departments 
monitoring and eradication costs.  
The approach used in the Victorian DPI BCA was to consider that the benefits and costs of 
ongoing area freedom programs can occur over a long time. A 20 year period was chosen as 
this is a common time period for new investment or re investment in stone fruit, pome fruit 
and vineyard development, and it captured the upfront fixed costs of establishing a PFA and 
the ongoing benefits over the life of an orchard derived from being in a PFA.
7 
5.3  Economic welfare effects of QFF management strategy 
The economic welfare effects of the proposed management options can be defined as the sum 
of consumer surplus (willingness to pay less consumer expenditure) and producer surplus 
(producer revenue less total variable cost of production) (see figure 4). 
Domestic consumer demand and domestic supply for a particular QFF host fruit of a given 
quality  in  the  absence  of  any  area  freedom  programs  is  shown  in  figure  4  using  partial 
equilibrium representation. It is partial in that in that it only represents demand for and supply 
of QFF host fruits in the Victorian economy and the immediate impacts of QFF management 
strategies on consumers and producers. The demand curve D shows where, in the absence of 
barriers to trade and any area freedom programs, consumers choose to consume quantity Qd at 
the world price Pw.
8 Consumer surplus is shown as the shaded triangle CS in figure 4.  
In figure 4, long run domestic producer supply without area freedom is shown by the curve S 
and producers supply Q0 at the world price Pw. The supply curve can be thought of as the 
marginal  cost  of  supply  for  fruit  of  a  given  quality.  The  difference  between  the  revenue 
received from supplying a given quantity and the marginal cost of producing it, is called 
producer  surplus  (triangle  PS  in  figure  4).  Notice  that  Q0  is  greater  than  domestic 
consumption  Qd  as  host  fruits  are  exported  at  price  Pw.  Figure  4  shows  that  even  in  the 
absence of area freedom programs Victoria is a net exporter of major QFF host fruits such as 
                                                 
5 Dimethoate is used as a post harvest chemical treatment for all fruit sent to South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania. 
6 Monitoring and eradication costs that were borne by State Departments were not included. 
7 For citrus, the period can be up to 25 years.   
8 This assumption was made because Australia is a small producer relative to world production and is unable to influence world 
prices. It is important to note that this simplification assumes QFF host fruit is of similar quality. In reality quality differences will 
be reflected in prices.   10 
citrus, table grapes and stone fruit. This is due to a number of non-sensitive export markets 
accepting fruit that has been treated pre and post harvest for QFF. 
 
Figure 4  Consumer and producer surplus from area wide management QFF 
strategy 











Source: Ha et al. (forthcoming) 
 
The analysis in Ha et  al (forthcoming)  estimates the change in economic welfare  from a 
movement to a QFF management program with area freedom compared to the without area 
freedom management as shown in figure 4. Continuing the partial equilibrium analysis, figure 
5 shows the long run supply curve for Victorian QFF host fruit producers moving down from 
S0  to S1. This is due to a decrease in per unit cost from avoided chemical use in QFF control 
(shown  by  (E-F)  in  figure  5).  The  short  run  supply  curve  Ss  shows  that  output  will  not 
increase  from  Q0  to  Q1,  as  shown  in  figure  5  by  the  long-run  supply  curve  moving 
downwards, until additional host fruit plants bear fruit. This can take up to seven years and 
therefore increases in output will not occur for some time.
9 It is assumed the price will remain 
unchanged (for a given quality of fruit) due to domestic producers being price takers on the 
world market and domestic producers being able to shift their fruit at relatively low cost to 
                                                 
9 QFF host fruits will take a number of factors into consideration before increasing their output, 
including forecast prices, domestic and export consumer demand for QFF host fruits and supply of 
QFF host fruits in world markets for medium to longer term.    11 
alternative export markets. The increase in producer surplus from lower costs in the presence 
of area freedom management strategies in the short run is represented by area EFGD and in 
the long-run by the shaded trapezium, ∆PS in figure 5. 
The Victorian DPI BCA was undertaken from the perspective that the existing QFF program 
is  publicly  funded.  If  the  government  was  to  completely  fund  future  QFF  area  freedom 
management strategies, as it currently does, this would result in a transfer from consumers to 
producers via the tax system. Consequently consumer surplus would decrease by the amount 
of the Government contribution to fund the QFF area freedom management strategies and the 
efficiency costs associated with raising the funds via the tax system (Ha et al. forthcoming). If 
producers  were  to  completely  fund  a  QFF  area  freedom  management  strategy,  as  in  the 
Central Burnett region QFF BCA, they would be willing to pay up to the value of the increase 
in producer surplus that such a program generated. As such, producer surplus increasing by 
less  than  shown  in  figure  5  by  an  amount  equal  to  the  cost  of  the  QFF  area  freedom 
management strategy implemented. 
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Source: Ha et al. (forthcoming) 
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5.3.1  Assumptions behind consumer surplus 
In the QFF BCA undertaken by Ha et al.(forthcoming), the approach followed that of HPC 
(1991) in assuming that consumer surplus would not be affected by any changes to QFF 
management policy. This assumption was made on the grounds that (Ha et al. forthcoming: 
32-33): 
•  Victorian consumers are indifferent to whether QFF host fruit of a given quality is grown 
domestically or imported; 
•  Victorian producers and consumers face a world price for QFF host fruit of a given 
quality.  Australia  is  a  small  producer  relative  to  world  production  and  is  unable  to 
influence world prices through its exports; 
•  Consumers  in  Victoria  face  a  situation  of  (relatively)  free  trade  in  QFF  host  fruits, 
whereby Victoria exports QFF host fruits after harvest and imports QFF host fruits at 
other times when domestic supply is not available, ensuring year round availability of 
fruit to consumers;
10 and 
•  QFF host fruit supplied by Victorian producers to domestic markets is of similar quality 
to that supplied to export markets due to common grade standards being used for export 
and domestic sales. 
In the event of an outbreak resulting in lower production levels, Victorian consumers would 
be able to meet their demand for QFF host fruits through importation at the world price, and 
consumer surplus would be unchanged. In the event of an outbreak which did not result in 
production losses but loss of market access to sensitive export markets, it was assumed that 
producers could shift their produce to less stringent export markets without incurring extra 
costs (for example Hong Kong). Subsequently, the amount of fruit available domestically 
would not change significantly, and local prices would not drop relative to the world price. 
PWC (2001) and Chambers and Franco-Dixon (2007) took a different approach and assumed 
that there would be an increase in supply of fruit on domestic markets due to a loss of export 
markets from QFF outbreaks. They assume that no other export markets could be found in 
the short term and that local prices would decrease reflecting the increase in QFF host fruit 
supply, consequently increasing consumer surplus. 
5.3.2  Assumptions behind producer surplus 
Producer  surplus  is  influenced  by  assumptions  about  access  to  markets,  export  market 
premiums and variable production costs. The introduction of a QFF area freedom strategy will 
increase producer surplus if it reduces their variable costs of controlling fruit fly. Ha et al. 
(forthcoming)  follow  the  economic  analysis  shown  in  HPC  (1991)  and  PWC  (2001)  and 
change  in  producer  surplus  from  the  introduction  of  QFF  area  freedom  was  estimated 
through:
  
•  Producer’s unit costs of fruit production falling relative to the ‘do nothing’ base case with 
the  introduction  of  QFF  management  as  pre-  and  post-harvest  treatment  of  fruits  are 
largely avoided. These are assumed to be reductions in variable costs; and 
•  Increased net prices due to access to QFF sensitive markets with price premiums. 
                                                 
10 Navel oranges, for example, are harvested from late April to December, after which time the fruit is 
not suitable for sale. Californian navel oranges are imported from late December through to April, 
when domestic (Victorian) production is not available. A similar situation occurs with other Queensland 
fruit fly host fruits (Ha et al. forthcoming).   13 
Figure 5 shows the movement down of the long run supply curve, reflecting a decrease in per 
unit cost of fruit fly control. Producer surplus increases because growers are able to produce 
more  fruit  at  lower  costs  in  the  short  run.  The  time  required  to  bring  new  orchards  into 
production means supply response is inelastic in the short term with little or no change in 
output expected in the first ten years after a policy change. No estimates of supply elasticity 
for Victorian QFF host fruits are quoted in the economic literature. The only study that has 
estimated  supply  elasticity  has  been  Alston  et  al.  (1980),  who  estimated  the  elasticity  of 
orange output for Australia was negligible for up to 10 years and even after 30 years found it 
was less than 0.18. Consequently the Victorian DPI BCA did not quantify the changes in 
producer  surplus  from  a  possible  increase  in  production.  The  implications  are  that  the 
Victorian DPI BCA may under estimate the long term benefits to industry of QFF area wide 
management strategies.  
Figure 5 shows that even with a change of supply costs, the price domestic producers receive 
remains at the world price as they are price takers on the world market. However, in reality, 
factors such as quality differences, seasonal availability, different consumer preferences for 
QFF host fruits between countries may result in price differences in export markets. PWC 
(2001) noted price premiums available for QFF host fruits in sensitive markets and quantified 
the market access premium for citrus to the US and stone fruit to Taiwan at 20 per cent 
margin  above  domestic  prices  averaged  over  1997-98  to  1999-00  for  FFEZ  production 
volumes.  However,  Ha  et  al.  (forthcoming)  took  a  different  approach  by  estimating  the 
difference between the price premium in the US market for citrus and the price available in 
the  non-sensitive  Hong  Kong  market.  Price  premiums  were  only  estimated  for  the  citrus 
market as 93 per cent of the value of Victorian production was exported in 2006-07 compared 
to 32, two, and eight per cent for grapes, pome fruit, and stone fruit respectively (Ha et al. 
forthcoming). 
Sensitivity testing was undertaken on the frequency of outbreaks and the costs of chemicals 
required to treat for QFF, pre and post harvest, in the absence of area freedom management. 
These  parameters  directly  affect  the  level  of  chemical  costs  avoided  and  the  size  of  the 
producer surplus estimated. Producer surplus was also tested for sensitivity to the benefits 
derived by citrus producers by accessing the US market. 
5.4  Benefits and costs considered 
Benefits and costs that were quantified in the BCAs from Table 3 were: 
•  Benefits from an export market price premium; 
•  Benefits from avoided pre-harvest and post-harvest chemical costs due to area freedom; 
and 
•  QFF management program costs. 
Benefits and costs that were considered but not quantified were: 
•  Benefits from IPM from not having to use chemicals; 
•  Backyard growers as a source of external benefits and costs; 
•  Environmental benefits and costs; and 
•  Human health benefits and costs. 
Other  costs not considered in the Ha et al. (forthcoming) BCA included the  cumulative 
benefits  of  QFF  area  freedom  strategies  (reduction  of  probabilities  over  time  from  area   14 
freedom management) and secondary benefits to businesses associated with fruit production 
(which were included in the PWC (2001) report). 
6  Preliminary results  
Preliminary  results  from  the  Ha  et  al.  (forthcoming)  BCA  on  QFF  management  options 
provided by Kalang Consultancy Pty Ltd (2008) (see table 2) are in table 4.  
 
Table 4:  Mean  values  of  discounted  annual  benefits  and  costs  of  all 
management options compared to ‘do nothing’ strategy ($ million) 






Market access  6.3  6.3  6.3 
Avoided  pre-harvest  chemical 
costs 
1.3  1.4  1.4 
Annual benefits  
Avoided  post-harvest 
disinfestation costs 
25.6  25.6  25.6 
TOTAL BENEFITS  33.2  33.3  33.3 
Annual 
production costs  
disinfestation  following  outbreaks 
(mean) 
13.9  12.3  11.7 
Program costs:  establishment (for first 3 years)  1.1  0.1  1.2 
Eradication (mean)  0.6  1.9  0.4  Annual  program 
maintenance 
costs:  
Fixed (incl. Suppression)  2.0  1.5  2.0 
TOTAL COSTS
#  17.6  15.8  14.3 
Benefit Cost Ratio*   2.02:1  2.15:1  2.35:1 
Notes: * BCR values reported here and in the report are the mean BCR values for all of the runs of the model, not the BCR as 
calculated from the mean values of the benefits and costs. # Annual costs include establishment costs for the first three years.  
Total costs are not the sum of the annual costs listed for each management option.  This is because they are discounted over 
the 20 year period. 
Source: (Ha et al., forthcoming) 
 
As can be seen in table 4, management option three has the highest benefit cost ratio. All 
three management options derive the same level of benefits from the presence of a QFF area 
freedom strategy allowing access to sensitive export markets. However, it is the differing 
probabilities of an outbreak associated with each management option, and the subsequent 
flow on effects for production and eradication costs which account for the BCR differences.  
The BCRs estimated in table 4 for Victorian DPI QFF management options are similar to 
findings by Chambers and Franco-Dixon (2007) for the Central Burnett QFF area freedom 
strategy at 2.27:1 and that of the PWC (2001) for the tri-state QFF strategy which had a BCR 
of 2.5:1, despite the scope of these studies being significantly different to the Victorian DPI 
BCA.  
Management option three was the most preferred option even when key variables such as the 
discount rate, outbreak frequencies, pre and post harvest treatment costs and export market 
price premium to the United States are subject to sensitivity analysis. Despite having the 
highest fixed costs due to establishing PFAs and ALPP, management option three was the 
preferred choice except in scenario two when it was adjusted to have more frequent outbreaks   15 
compared to the other options (see end of section 5.1 for a description of scenario one and 
two). 
7  The question of funding biosecurity programs 
The counterfactual of a ‘do nothing’ has the advantage of enabling estimates to be made of 
the total benefits of each alternative management strategy. It also highlights the distribution of 
the benefits and costs, with the main economic beneficiaries of implementing an area freedom 
strategy for QFF in Victoria being producers exporting to sensitive markets (also identified in 
PWC (2001)). This has implications for the way the preferred option on management should 
be funded. 
Of the past BCAs on QFF management strategies discussed in this paper, all examined a 
move  away  from  existing  funding  arrangements  based  almost  entirely  on  State  and 
Commonwealth  government  funding  to  a  cost  sharing  approach.  The  PWC  (2001)  study 
considered the beneficiary pays principle as instructed by the terms of reference for their 
BCA, and recommended funding for the tri-state board to be divided as 30 to 50 per cent to 
come from Government, 70 to 50 per cent from beneficiaries with the ratio between exporters 
and  growers  3:1,  and  the  state  governments  to  continue  funding  roles  as  defined  under 
legislation. The HPC (1991) study identified that most of the net gain to society of an area-
free  management  strategy  comes  from  reduced  on-farm  costs,  with  the  net  savings  only 
estimated for the citrus industry. In terms of funding, they state in theory the beneficiaries 
should pay, the beneficiaries being the growers of host fruits and vegetables. So, HPC (1991) 
suggested it would be ‘reasonable’ that these groups contribute funding to such a program. As 
HPC  (1991)  also  identified  backyard  growers  receiving  benefits  from  area  freedom  (they 
avoid the use of chemicals for home grown fruit), they suggest that the government also 
contribute funding. In contrast Chambers and Franco-Dixon (2007) note in their BCA that 
ongoing funding for the area freedom of QFF in the Central Burnett region in Queensland was 
being met entirely by the producers in the region.  
The PWC (2001) BCA noted problems with using the beneficiary pays principle, including 
that  the  beneficiaries  may  change  over  time  and  the  practical  and  legal  constraints  to 
collecting funds for a QFF management strategy from growers. These problems were also 
noted  by  the  HPC  (1991).  However,  neither  of  these  issues  seemed  to  have  been 
insurmountable for the Central Burnett region in implementing an area freedom strategy for 
QFF. This may be because the growers in the region are locked out of export markets due to 
the presence of QFF and the benefits from meeting area freedom requirements for desirable 
export markets exceed the costs by more than double.  
As discussed in section 5.3, how the funding of a QFF area freedom management strategy is 
shared between government and producers will affect the distribution of economic welfare 
such a strategy ultimately generates.  
8  Concluding comments 
Escalating costs of the current Victorian QFF management strategy resulted in the Victorian 
DPI undertaking a major review of their current program and a BCA of three alternative 
management options. In undertaking a BCA on area freedom biosecurity strategies, there are 
a number of issues which researchers need to make decisions about, including the duration of 
the analysis, how to incorporate risk and uncertainty, how to estimate welfare effects, and 
how  to  consider  social  and  environmental  costs  and  benefits.  Decisions  made  on  these 
questions  for  three  publicly  available  BCAs  on  area  freedom  programs  for  QFF  were 
considered in relation to the Victorian DPI BCA in this paper.   16 
On the above decision variables, there were differences on the treatment of welfare effects, 
time periods analysed and approaches to risk and uncertainty. The main difference in the 
treatment of welfare effects was with Chambers and Franco-Dixon (2007) and PWC (2001) 
who estimated an increase in consumer surplus from lower domestic prices of fruit when 
sensitive markets were lost due to area freedom strategies not being pursued. The Ha et al. 
(forthcoming) BCA assumed that QFF host fruit producers would still be able to access non-
sensitive export markets without area freedom management strategies. 
In all studies, different time periods were used to calculate the net present value of the stream 
of future benefits and costs. This was because the strategies being analysed were different or 
influences on the strategies being successful were different. The Victorian DPI BCA analysed 
future strategies for a much longer time period relative to the other studies. 
All studies took different approaches to incorporating risk, both in the way risk was addressed 
and the variables for which risk was considered. Each approach was determined in part by the 
data which were available, and also by the judgements about the main risk factors of each 
strategy  under  consideration.  The  study  by  PWC  (2001)  did  not  include  any  formal  risk 
analysis, while HPC (1991) looked at two levels of outbreak intensity. Chambers and Franco-
Dixon  (2007)  used  state  contingent  analysis  to  look  at  different  probabilities  related  post 
harvest chemical use and ICA scenarios. In comparison, the Victorian DPI BCA estimated an 
outbreak probability distribution for each management option to account for risk as well as 
undertaking  sensitivity  analysis  around  key  variables.  In  two  scenarios  the  effects  of 
uncertainty surrounding possible changes in the QFF persistence were examined.  
In all studies, the costs and benefits to producers and governments of implementing an area 
freedom  strategy  were  measured.  Certain  costs  and  benefits,  such  as  the  benefits  from 
retaining integrated pest management regimes and the external benefits to backyard growers 
of fruit from AWM were not quantified in any of the studies but were recognised as providing 
additional benefits on top the net economic benefits derived by AWM strategies. While this 
approach simplifies the BCA without ignoring these non-market benefits and costs, the issue 
of how large these benefits and costs might be is still important when considering funding 
options for the chosen strategy. 
In making use of the information generated by the BCA on the three management options for 
QFF, Victoria DPI faces the task of considering how to fund a new strategy. Previous QFF 
BCAs all suggest that the beneficiaries of such strategies should contribute to their costs; 
however, this has  generally not been pursued in the past. Difficulties  associated with the 
collection of funds from identified beneficiaries have been noted as a reason for not pursuing 
such a policy. However, this situation is no different to the organisation and funding of rural 
research, where funds are collected through a levy from producers. The design of funding 
mechanisms and collection of funds from producers for biosecurity programs continues to be 
a relevant policy issue and will ultimately determine the net economic welfare derived from a 
QFF area freedom management strategy for Victoria. 
In conclusion, lessons learnt from this review of QFF area freedom BCAs include:  
•  By undertaking a BCA, the costs and benefits and their distribution are clarified and can 
be different to prior expectations, such as in the Ha et al. (forthcoming) DPI BCA the 
main source of benefits was from avoided post harvest disinfestation costs rather than 
market access premiums as was the case in the PWC (2001) study;  
•  Assumptions about the QFF host fruit markets are critical and should be tested using 
sensitivity analysis;   17 
•  Risk and uncertainty should be explicitly incorporated where possible to account for a 
range of possible outcomes that might occur in reality, such as price movements and 
outbreak occurrence; and 
•  That the funding of such programs has implications for overall distribution of economic 
welfare generated. 
Whilst the method and many of the main issues in conducting a BCA of biosecurity policy 
options are common, the detail matters. Every policy question is unique and presents unique 
issues and problems of theory and data to resolve. Importantly, having confronted the issues 
and questions, the approach and reasoning used to resolve these should be documented in 
clear detail to provide guidance for subsequent BCA analysts of similar policy options.  
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